9.9元时代，精品咖啡注定只能小而美吗？In the 9.9 yuan era, is boutique coffee destined to be small and beautiful?

本文来自微信公众号： 商业评论零售现场 ，作者：贾贺辉

6月7日，媒体报道称知名连锁咖啡品牌Seesaw的运营主体上海西舍咖啡有限公司被申请破产清算。作为不少中产群体心中的“咖啡白月光”，目前在全国的门店仅剩30多家，与高峰期的135家门店相比闭店超过100家。

表面来看，Seesaw从资本宠儿到破产清算来自现制咖啡市场9.9元价格战的冲击。不过，价格战最多只是压垮Seesaw的最后一根稻草，核心因素还是在于品牌内部在精品和规模之间的摇摆不定。

既想要精品调性，又想要规模扩张，最终使得两头落空。

Seesaw的破产清算无疑给精品咖啡行业敲响警钟，不过值得思考的是，在9.9元时代难道精品咖啡注定只能小而美吗？答案或许并非如此。

Seesaw的经营危机并非现在才开始显现。

早在2024年初就有消息称Seesaw在全国出现大范围闭店，2025年初被曝光有多家供应商在追讨欠款，此后还有前员工在社媒平台讨薪等。在天眼查等平台上，运营主体上海西舍咖啡仅商业合作纠纷就有32起，创始人吴晓梅被多次限制高消费。

作为国内精品咖啡界鼻祖，Seesaw成立于2012年。彼时国内精品咖啡市场主要被以星巴克为代表的外资连锁品牌垄断，本土精品咖啡大多以独立门店的形式存在，并未形成规模化。

Seesaw抓住机会，通过“一店一设计”的装修风格和完整的供应链体系打入精品咖啡赛道，走连锁化发展路线。

2017年，Seesaw成为第一批顺利拿到融资的本土连锁咖啡品牌，2021和2022年又分别获得包括喜茶在内的多家机构投资，品牌估值10亿元。2023年Seesaw在全国累计开出100多家门店，高线城市核心商圈几乎都有覆盖，社媒平台上消费者对其的打卡随处可见，创始人吴晓梅更是放出豪言要在接下来的5年内扩张到500~1000家门店。

不曾想，巅峰期过后很快就迎来陨落。

很多人认为是9.9元价格战击垮了以Seesaw为代表的精品咖啡，不过这似乎并不能解释为什么Manner、M Stand等同类型品牌活的很好？

一方面，Seesaw跌落神坛有价格战因素的影响。

2023年以瑞幸、库迪为代表的连锁咖啡品牌发动价格战，通过9.9元的优惠刺激来抢夺消费者并在此过程中疯狂扩张，直到2025年外卖大战的到来使得这一趋势再次往后延续。

价格战除了改写国内咖啡的市场格局，更大的影响在于消费者对现制咖啡的价格有了一条基准线。当9.9元成为行业主流，超过这一价格的咖啡就会被大众消费者贴上“不值当”的标签，不过价格战最多只是影响Seesaw的外部因素。

另一方面，大店模式所带来的重资产压力和回本周期慢实则是更加关键的内部原因。

从最初创立，Seesaw在精品咖啡赛道走的就是大店路线。早期门店平均在100~200平之间，北京和南京等城市甚至还有超过200平的大店，为突出自身的高端属性Seesaw会给不同的门店做专属设计，类似星巴克的“一店一设”。

从消费者的角度出发，这种大店经营的模式具备较强的吸引力。只是对品牌方而言，租金、装修等多个方面较高成本无疑会形成较大的现金流压力，也给自身带来坪效较低的短板。

更关键的是从2017年拿到融资后，对赌协议的迫切压力下，小众且精品的市场定位无奈要给大众化发展的目标让路，于是Seesaw开始激进扩张。独特的大店精品模式要实现规模化扩张仅靠外部输血显然不够，必须要经过回本周期后自身具备稳定的造血能力才有可能。

左手要精品、右手要规模，天然矛盾的发展背景下使得Seesaw在战略层面摇摆不定，反而丢掉了供应链优势。一边产品研发不足，另一边又想通过降价来吸引平价客流，最终陷入老客户不断流失、新客户又吸引不到的尴尬境地。

放眼整个行业，现制咖啡市场走极致性价比与高端精品的两头越来越强，中间被彻底架空。这不是价格战的结果，而是消费心智成熟的必然导向。

上世纪90年代末，星巴克以精品咖啡的产品定位进入中国市场。彼时北京房价平均每平约2000元，而星巴克一杯卡布奇诺起售价19元，国人对于现制咖啡的认知度几乎为0。

通过打造第三空间，星巴克把咖啡馆定义成办公场所之外的社交地点，叠加三四十元的产品高定价和极具格调的门店装修，喝星巴克逐渐成为都市白领等精英阶层的身份标签。星巴克借此机会在国内培养了第一批现制咖啡消费者，同时也建立了“现磨咖啡=高端生活方式”的心智锚点。

从星巴克进入中国市场，此后十几年里在国内喝现制咖啡的首选几乎都是星巴克，预算有限则选择雀巢等速溶咖啡品牌。尽管在此过程中本土精品咖啡品牌逐步创立，不过由于规模化不足，更多局限在相对较小的圈层。

直到2017年本土连锁咖啡品牌瑞幸横空出世，成为现制咖啡市场中的一条“鲶鱼”。

同样不错的品质、更高的效率，瑞幸们只用短短几年时间就迅速完成了对国内现制咖啡市场的消费者教育。

数据显示，2018年国内咖啡市场规模约1200亿，人均消费咖啡数为6杯，速溶咖啡仍然是该行业的主流。到2025年这一规模变成2700亿，全国人均消费咖啡数为28.57杯。

当现制咖啡逐渐变得亲民、高效且随处可见，带来的直接结果是目标消费群体持续扩大，咖啡消费日趋常态化，现制咖啡早已不再像以前如星巴克那样能代表消费圈层等。

如此一来，当大众对现制咖啡头顶的光环逐渐祛魅后，中间品牌被架空。

一边是效率至上的性价比品牌瑞幸等，另一边是早已抢占消费者心智、对精品咖啡品牌产生虹吸效应的星巴克，留给大多数精品咖啡的市场份额所剩不多。

典型案例是星巴克也曾在2025年短暂受到过9.9元咖啡价格战的影响，销量和利润均出现明显下滑。这恰恰证明了星巴克的护城河——当价格战退潮、消费者趋于理性，真正要选择购买一杯精品咖啡时，品牌影响力显著、门店覆盖范围更广泛的星巴克仍是首选。

最终形成的现状是，整个现制咖啡市场呈现出明显的两极分化。

大众层面以早已突破万店规模的瑞幸、库迪为代表，15元左右价格带，主要比拼效率；精品层面以星巴克、Manner和M Stand为例，客单价维持在30元左右，偏线下空间、品质和社群。

Manner依托更加轻量化的小店模式，目前在全国的门店规模已经突破2400家；M Stand主要聚焦高端商场，门店数量超过640家。

市场分层的趋势几乎不可逆转，位于中间赛道尤其很多中型连锁精品咖啡品牌普遍面临更大的生存压力。窄门餐眼数据，仅2024年国内咖啡市场关停门店数近4万家，相当一部分是中型连锁品牌和独立咖啡店。

Seesaw破产，不代表精品咖啡注定小而美。

第一，平价产品虽然构成了国内现制咖啡市场消费的基本盘，不过精品咖啡仍有一席之地。

目前国内精品咖啡市场，外资品牌中星巴克凭借在行业内的多年深耕正持续占据着高端心智，2026财年第一季度在中国市场营收8.234亿美元，同比增长11%；Manner、M Stand等连锁品牌的成功，直接验证了本土精品咖啡持续发展的可行性；前不久，瑞幸大股东收购小众品牌蓝瓶咖啡，加码对高端精品市场布局，侧面证明精品咖啡市场的前景。

第二，大方向来看，国内现制咖啡市场仍处在快速扩容通道。

弗若斯特沙利文行业报告显示，2026年国内现制咖啡市场规模预计将会突破3200亿。对比欧美日等发达国家，增量空间巨大，哪怕2025年国内人均年消费咖啡数量近30杯，相较于欧美动辄数百杯起步，国内人均咖啡消费量远不及海外市场的1/10。

第三，随着国内咖啡市场的消费分层趋势愈发明显，大众刚需和精品之间绝非“你死我活”的取代关系。

如今有越来越多的消费者正在形成工作日喝主打功能属性的平价咖啡、周末节假日出行打卡喝更具品质和能够提供情绪价值的精品咖啡。据《2026中国城市咖啡发展报告》，咖啡豆成交额增速高达140.38%，远超速溶咖啡的69.05%，说明消费者对精品豆的认知和需求正在快速提升，这种消费模式恰恰为精品咖啡留下了增量空间。

那么，以Manner和星巴克为例，来看精品咖啡品牌到底该如何突破小而美天花板的限制？总结来看，有两条路径：路径一，“效率型精品”——用极致成本控制和标准化，把精品咖啡做“快”；路径二，“体验型精品”——用空间差异化和本土化，把精品咖啡做“深”。

前者定位效率型精品，在全国开出2000多家直营门店，核心在于对全方位策略的精准把控。

成本策略方面，Manner主要选择写字楼大堂和人流量密集的商场角落，90%位于高线城市的写字楼集群，面积普遍维持在5~10平米，这种方式使得租金成本的占比极低。东方证券研报显示，Manner的租金成本只有传统咖啡店的10%~20%，坪效数据方面单店日均收入7000~8000元，毛利率高达62.5%。

产品策略方面，Manner将SKU精简到47款产品，主要包括五类经典系列和两类限定款。优势在于除了出品标准化程度较高，品牌还能够提高SOE单品咖啡豆所制作的饮品价格来形成高溢价，扩大利润空间。

把原本应该做慢的精品咖啡加上效率这个催化剂，Manner走出了一条独属于自己的快咖啡消费场景的精品路线。

后者定位体验型精品，星巴克的"千店千面"与第三空间回归。2025年星巴克启动“回归星巴克”战略，重拾第三空间定位；2026年战略合作博裕投资，发布以“千店千面”为核心的全新发展战略，加速在地化转型。

具体来看，星巴克的战略是基于不同社区客群的定位来打造差异化产品和场景体验，构建专属的社区文化和相关活动。

门店创新上，星巴克覆盖10平米迷你店、办公楼便捷点、甄选主题门店等多元形态，核心目的无疑都是为了更加贴合主流生活方式。产品创新上，高蛋白拿铁满足健身群体和注重营养消费者的需求、燕麦丝绒拿铁覆盖乳糖不耐受群体，除此之外还有季节限定的山茶花花漾拿铁等，星巴克正充分发挥着本土化能力。

诚然，9.9元价格战对行业造成了洗牌效应。不过在现制咖啡市场转型过程中，其真正被抛弃的不是“精品”，而是成本失衡、定位模糊、依靠外部输血的精品咖啡品牌。

换句话来说，精品咖啡的未来比拼的从不只是规模“大小”，而在商业模式的自洽，即"成本结构"与"价值主张"的精准匹配。未来现制咖啡赛道或许会分成两类，一类是走极致效率和性价比的品牌，另一类是具备差异化的精品品牌，处在模糊中间地带的品牌大概率会被市场逐步淘汰。

对于精品咖啡品牌而言，"小而美"不是宿命，"不自洽"才是。正处在扩容通道的咖啡市场，精品品牌如果能够坚持更适合自己的商业模式，达成千店规模绝非天方夜谭。

This article is from the WeChat official account: Business Review Retail Site, written by Jia Hehui

On June 7th, media reported that the operating entity of the well-known chain coffee brand Seesaw, Shanghai Xishe Coffee Co., Ltd., was filed for bankruptcy liquidation. As the "coffee white moonlight" in the hearts of many middle-class people, there are currently only over 30 stores left nationwide, with over 100 stores closed compared to the peak of 135 stores.

On the surface, Seesaw went from being a capital darling to bankruptcy liquidation due to the impact of the 9.9 yuan price war in the freshly brewed coffee market. However, the price war is at most the last straw that breaks Seesaw, and the core factor lies in the brand's internal wavering between boutique and scale.

I wanted both high-quality tone and scale expansion, but ultimately failed to achieve both goals.

The bankruptcy liquidation of Seesaw undoubtedly sounded the alarm for the boutique coffee industry, but it is worth considering whether boutique coffee is destined to be small and beautiful in the 9.9 yuan era? The answer may not be so.

Seesaw's business crisis is not just beginning to manifest now.

As early as early 2024, there were reports of widespread store closures across the country for Seesaw. In early 2025, it was exposed that multiple suppliers were pursuing unpaid debts, and former employees were also demanding salaries on social media platforms. On platforms such as Tianyancha, the operating entity Shanghai Xishe Coffee has had 32 commercial cooperation disputes, and its founder Wu Xiaomei has been repeatedly restricted from high consumption.

As the pioneer of the domestic specialty coffee industry, Seesaw was founded in 2012. At that time, the domestic specialty coffee market was mainly monopolized by foreign chain brands represented by Starbucks, and local specialty coffee mostly existed in the form of independent stores, without forming a scale.

Seesaw seized the opportunity to enter the boutique coffee market through its "one store, one design" decoration style and complete supply chain system, and embarked on a chain development path.

In 2017, Seesaw became one of the first local chain coffee brands to successfully obtain financing. In 2021 and 2022, it received investments from multiple institutions, including Heytea, with a brand valuation of 1 billion yuan. By 2023, Seesaw will have opened over 100 stores nationwide, covering almost all core commercial districts in high tier cities. Consumers can easily check in on its social media platforms, and founder Wu Xiaomei has made a bold statement to expand to 500-1000 stores in the next 5 years.

Unexpectedly, after the peak period, there was a rapid decline.

Many people believe that the 9.9 yuan price war has defeated boutique coffee represented by Seesaw, but this does not seem to explain why brands such as Manner and M Stand are thriving?

On the one hand, Seesaw's fall from the pedestal is influenced by price wars.

In 2023, chain coffee brands represented by Luckin Coffee and Kudi launched a price war, using a 9.9 yuan discount to compete for consumers and aggressively expand in the process, until the arrival of the food delivery war in 2025 to continue this trend again.

The price war not only rewrites the market structure of domestic coffee, but also has a greater impact on consumers having a benchmark for the price of freshly made coffee. When 9.9 yuan becomes the mainstream in the industry, coffee priced above this level will be labeled as "not worth it" by the general public, but the price war is at most only an external factor affecting Seesaw.

On the other hand, the heavy asset pressure and slow payback period brought about by the large store model are actually more critical internal reasons.

Since its inception, Seesaw has been following the path of large stores in the specialty coffee industry. In the early days, the average size of stores was between 100 and 200 square meters, with even large stores exceeding 200 square meters in cities such as Beijing and Nanjing. To highlight its high-end attributes, Seesaw would create exclusive designs for different stores, similar to Starbucks' "one store, one setup".

From the perspective of consumers, this large store operation model has strong appeal. For brand owners, the high costs of rent, decoration, and other aspects undoubtedly create significant cash flow pressure, and also bring their own shortcomings of low floor area efficiency.

More importantly, after obtaining financing in 2017, under the urgent pressure of the betting agreement, Seesaw's niche and boutique market positioning had to give way to its goal of mass development, so it began to aggressively expand. The unique model of large boutique stores cannot achieve large-scale expansion solely through external blood transfusion. It is necessary to have stable hematopoietic capacity after a payback period.

The natural contradiction between high-quality products on the left and scale on the right has caused Seesaw to waver in its strategic direction, resulting in the loss of its supply chain advantage. On one hand, there is insufficient product research and development, while on the other hand, they want to attract affordable customers by lowering prices, ultimately falling into the embarrassing situation of losing old customers and not being able to attract new customers.

Looking at the entire industry, the freshly brewed coffee market is becoming increasingly strong in terms of both ultimate cost-effectiveness and high-end boutique products, with the middle completely sidelined. This is not the result of a price war, but the inevitable direction of mature consumer mentality.

In the late 1990s, Starbucks entered the Chinese market as a premium coffee product. At that time, the average housing price in Beijing was about 2000 yuan per square meter, while the starting price for a cappuccino at Starbucks was 19 yuan, and the awareness of freshly made coffee among Chinese people was almost zero.

By creating a third space, Starbucks defines coffee shops as social locations outside of the office, coupled with high priced products priced at 30-40 yuan and stylish store decoration. Drinking Starbucks has gradually become an identity label for urban white-collar workers and other elite classes. Starbucks took this opportunity to cultivate the first group of freshly brewed coffee consumers in China, while also establishing the mental anchor of "freshly ground coffee=high-end lifestyle".

From Starbucks entering the Chinese market, in the following decade or so, Starbucks was almost always the first choice for drinking freshly brewed coffee in China, while Nestle's constant dissolving coffee brand was chosen due to limited budget. Although local specialty coffee brands were gradually established during this process, they were limited to relatively small circles due to insufficient scale.

Until 2017, local chain coffee brand Luckin Coffee emerged as a "catfish" in the freshly brewed coffee market.

With equally good quality and higher efficiency, Luckin Coffee quickly completed consumer education on the domestic freshly brewed coffee market in just a few years.

Data shows that in 2018, the domestic coffee market size was about 120 billion yuan, with a per capita consumption of 6 cups of coffee. Instant coffee is still the mainstream in this industry. By 2025, this scale will reach 270 billion, and the per capita consumption of coffee in the country will be 28.57 cups.

As freshly brewed coffee gradually becomes more accessible, efficient, and ubiquitous, the direct result is that the target consumer group continues to expand, coffee consumption becomes increasingly normalized, and freshly brewed coffee no longer represents the consumer circle like Starbucks did before.

In this way, as the public gradually diminishes the halo over freshly made coffee, the middle brand is sidelined.

On one hand, there are cost-effective brands such as Luckin Coffee that prioritize efficiency, and on the other hand, Starbucks, which has already captured consumers' minds and created a siphon effect on premium coffee brands, leaving little market share for most premium coffee brands.

A typical case is that Starbucks was briefly affected by the 9.9 yuan coffee price war in 2025, resulting in a significant decline in sales and profits. This precisely proves Starbucks' moat - when the price war recedes and consumers become more rational, Starbucks, which has significant brand influence and wider store coverage, is still the first choice when choosing to buy a cup of premium coffee.

The final situation is that the entire freshly brewed coffee market presents a clear polarization.

At the public level, representatives such as Luckin Coffee and Kudi, which have already surpassed the scale of 10000 stores, offer a price range of around 15 yuan and mainly compete for efficiency; Taking Starbucks, Manner, and M Stand as examples at the boutique level, the average customer price remains around 30 yuan, with a focus on offline space, quality, and community.

Manner relies on a more lightweight small store model and currently has over 2400 stores nationwide; M Stand mainly focuses on high-end shopping malls, with over 640 stores.

The trend of market stratification is almost irreversible, and many medium-sized chain specialty coffee brands in the middle track are generally facing greater survival pressure. According to data from Narrow Gate Restaurant, nearly 40000 coffee shops will shut down in the domestic coffee market in 2024 alone, with a significant portion being medium-sized chain brands and independent coffee shops.

Seesaw's bankruptcy does not mean that boutique coffee is destined to be small and beautiful.

Firstly, although affordable products constitute the basic consumer base of the domestic freshly brewed coffee market, premium coffee still has a place.

At present, in the domestic premium coffee market, Starbucks, a foreign brand, continues to dominate the high-end market with years of deep cultivation in the industry. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2026, its revenue in the Chinese market was 823.4 million US dollars, a year-on-year increase of 11%; The success of chain brands such as Manner and M Stand directly validates the feasibility of the sustainable development of local specialty coffee; Not long ago, Luckin Coffee's major shareholder acquired the niche brand Blue Bottle Coffee, intensifying its layout in the high-end boutique market, indirectly proving the prospects of the boutique coffee market.

Secondly, in terms of overall direction, the domestic freshly brewed coffee market is still in a rapid expansion channel.

According to the Frost&Sullivan Industry Report, the domestic freshly brewed coffee market is expected to exceed 320 billion yuan by 2026. Compared to developed countries such as Europe, America, and Japan, there is huge room for growth. Even if the per capita annual consumption of coffee in China is nearly 30 cups by 2025, compared to Europe and America which often start with hundreds of cups, the per capita coffee consumption in China is far less than 1/10 of that in overseas markets.

Thirdly, as the consumption stratification trend in the domestic coffee market becomes increasingly apparent, there is no such thing as a "life or death" substitution relationship between popular demand and premium products.

Nowadays, more and more consumers are forming the trend of drinking affordable coffee with main functional attributes on weekdays, and checking in for high-quality and emotionally valuable boutique coffee during weekends and holidays. According to the "2026 China Urban Coffee Development Report", the growth rate of coffee bean transaction volume has reached 140.38%, far exceeding the 69.05% of instant coffee, indicating that consumers' awareness and demand for premium beans are rapidly increasing. This consumption model precisely leaves incremental space for premium coffee.

So, taking Manner and Starbucks as examples, let's take a look at how boutique coffee brands can break through the limitations of small but beautiful ceilings? In summary, there are two paths: path one, "efficiency oriented boutique" - using ultimate cost control and standardization to make specialty coffee "fast"; Path 2, "Experiential Boutique" - Using spatial differentiation and localization to make boutique coffee "deep".

The former is positioned as an efficiency oriented boutique, with over 2000 directly operated stores across the country, and its core lies in precise control of comprehensive strategies.

In terms of cost strategy, Manner mainly chooses office lobbies and densely populated shopping mall corners, with 90% of office clusters located in high tier cities, generally maintaining an area of 5-10 square meters. This approach results in a very low proportion of rental costs. According to a research report by Oriental Securities, Manner's rental cost is only 10% to 20% of that of traditional coffee shops. In terms of floor area efficiency data, the daily average revenue of a single store is 7000 to 8000 yuan, and the gross profit margin is as high as 62.5%.

In terms of product strategy, Manner has streamlined its SKUs to 47 products, mainly including five classic series and two limited editions. The advantage lies in the fact that in addition to a high degree of standardization in production, the brand can also increase the price of beverages made from SOE single coffee beans to form a high premium and expand profit margins.

By adding efficiency as a catalyst to the originally slow paced specialty coffee, Manner has embarked on a unique boutique route for fast coffee consumption.

The latter is positioned as an experiential boutique, with Starbucks' "Thousand Stores, Thousand Faces" and the return of the third space. In 2025, Starbucks will launch the "Return to Starbucks" strategy and regain its third space positioning; In 2026, strategic cooperation with Boyu Investment will be launched, with a new development strategy centered on "thousands of stores and thousands of faces" to accelerate localization transformation.

Specifically, Starbucks' strategy is to create differentiated products and experiential scenarios based on the positioning of different community customer groups, and to build exclusive community culture and related activities.

In terms of store innovation, Starbucks covers a variety of forms such as 10 square meter mini stores, convenient office buildings, and selected themed stores, with the core purpose undoubtedly being to better fit mainstream lifestyles. In terms of product innovation, high protein latte meets the needs of fitness enthusiasts and nutrition conscious consumers, oat velvet latte covers lactose intolerant groups, and in addition, there are seasonal limited edition camellia flower latte, etc. Starbucks is fully leveraging its localization capabilities.

Indeed, the 9.9 yuan price war has caused a reshuffle effect on the industry. However, in the process of transforming the freshly brewed coffee market, what has truly been abandoned is not "boutique", but boutique coffee brands with imbalanced costs, unclear positioning, and reliance on external blood transfusion.

In other words, the future competition of premium coffee is not just about size, but also about the self consistency of business models, that is, the precise matching of "cost structure" and "value proposition". In the future, the field of freshly brewed coffee may be divided into two categories: one is brands that pursue ultimate efficiency and cost-effectiveness, and the other is boutique brands with differentiation. Brands in the ambiguous middle zone are likely to be gradually eliminated by the market.

For boutique coffee brands, 'small and beautiful' is not destiny, 'inconsistent' is. In the coffee market that is currently expanding its channels, it is not impossible for boutique brands to achieve a scale of thousands of stores if they can adhere to a more suitable business model.