超10万家餐饮店杀入咖啡赛道,为啥都想当“瑞幸”?Why do over 100000 restaurants want to be Luckin Coffee as they enter the coffee market?

2026-05-28 11:00:53 admin 890
最近几年,餐饮市场的竞争可谓是日趋白热化,在这个几乎近身肉搏的市场上,各家都在使出浑身解数来提升竞争力,其中最显著的趋势是集体杀入咖啡赛道,那么,为啥餐饮企业都想当“瑞幸”呢?
图片关键词
一、超10万家餐饮店杀入咖啡赛道
据红餐网的报道,超10万家餐饮店同时杀进咖啡赛道,市场会发生哪些变化?过去几年,瑞幸咖啡用“平价咖啡”和“咖啡奶茶化”把咖啡拉下神坛,在中国市场踏出了一条新赛道,自己稳坐领头羊地位。
近段时间以来,从新茶饮头部品牌到连锁快餐巨头都在“开咖啡店”。它们的手段和瑞幸当初如出一辙——“平价咖啡”“咖啡奶茶化”。也就是说,这些手握上万家门店的餐饮巨头,瞄准的并不是星巴克,而是瑞幸。
前不久,茉莉奶白全国2300多家门店首次推出咖啡系列产品“400次鸳鸯泰奶”和“针王苹果拿铁”。据行业媒体“咖门”报道,上线当天,全国多个门店直接爆单,8小时卖出超过21万杯新品。最近古茗推出的香草籽维也纳、苦尽柑来拿铁等产品,也成了小爆款。
2023年,肯德基正式推出了独立的咖啡品牌肯悦咖啡,短短两年多时间,已经开出超过2600家门店,还计划在2027年底前冲到5000家。
2024年5月,麦当劳旗下的麦咖啡最新一次披露相关数据,彼时全国门店数已超过3500家,如今两年过去,规模只会有增无减。
2025年底,华莱士在全国上万家门店铺设咖啡机;老乡鸡、超意兴等中式米饭快餐品牌都有涉足咖啡业务。
今年3月起,蜜雪冰城陆续在全国门店上线咖啡机,正式进军现磨咖啡。而它的子品牌幸运咖,在去年11月就已经在全球开出了超10000家门店,规模碾压绝大部分咖啡品牌。
图片关键词
二、为啥大家都想当“瑞幸”?
近期,中国现制饮品市场迎来了一场前所未有的“混战”,各家茶饮、餐饮企业纷纷入局咖啡,如此大规模布局到底意味着什么?
首先,瑞幸证明了平民化大众咖啡是个好生意。在瑞幸之前,中国咖啡市场长期被国际巨头定义,咖啡被打上了强烈的“第三空间”社交属性与精英阶层的文化烙印,这种模式本质上是高溢价、低频次的“小众生意”,当时买一杯咖啡都是要拍朋友圈的社交货币甚至被定义为某种轻奢产品。而瑞幸的成功之处在于,它用互联网的流量思维重构了咖啡的产业属性,硬生生地将咖啡从“社交货币”拉回到了“功能饮料”的本源定位,让咖啡一夜之间回归到了当年埃塞俄比亚牧羊人用于提神醒脑的浆果的本源。
九块九的平民咖啡,看似挤压了利润空间,实则是对传统咖啡市场进行了一次降维打击与底层收割。它彻底打破了价格门槛,将原本不喝咖啡的庞大群体拉入了咖啡消费的漏斗,实现了市场的指数级扩容。这也是为什么在瑞幸经历了别的品牌可能都已经是毁灭打击的财务造假暴雷、退市危机之后,反而愈挫愈勇,甚至触底反弹的根源。
当市场看到瑞幸门店数量问鼎全球第一时,资本与产业界才真正觉醒:在中国,规模化的平民咖啡才是真正的现金牛。这种示范效应是极具颠覆性的,它让所有从业者意识到,咖啡的尽头不是小资情调,而是极致的性价比与海量复购。
图片关键词
其次,跨界做咖啡的边际成本极低。很多人可能不理解,为什么做奶茶的品牌能这么快就把咖啡做起来?原因非常简单:咖啡机一台几万块甚至一些低端咖啡机比如说滴滤式咖啡更加便宜,咖啡豆作为一种基础农产品商业化的采购成本极低,培训一个店员学会做咖啡可能只需要几天时间。相比于开一家新店动辄几十万上百万的投入,在现有门店里加几台咖啡机,简直就是“顺手的事”。
更关键的是,这些品牌手里有三样瑞幸当年花了巨大代价才建起来的东西:现成的门店网络、现成的客群基础、成熟的供应链体系。蜜雪冰城有两万多家店,每一家店都是一个潜在的咖啡售卖点;古茗有近万家店,每一家店的顾客本来就有饮品消费习惯。你不需要重新教育市场,不需要重新选址,不需要重新建供应链,你只需要在原有的生意上“加一个SKU”就行了。
这是非常显著的范围经济效应,企业利用已有的资源和能力,以极低的边际成本进入新的业务领域。对于这些餐饮和茶饮品牌来说,咖啡不是一个新生意,而是一个可以几乎零成本嫁接到现有生意上的“增量”。这种跨界的性价比,高到让人无法拒绝。
图片关键词
第三,快速下沉的市场可谓是各家的优质蓝海。过去国内咖啡市场的竞争,主要集中在一线、新一线城市的核心商圈,赛道竞争趋于白热化,头部品牌的市场格局基本稳固,中小品牌、后入局者很难在核心市场实现突围。但当下中国咖啡行业正处于从核心城市向三四线城市、县域市场、乡镇市场快速下沉的关键阶段,一方面,这个市场不是一点基础都没有的小白,这些年库迪咖啡、幸运咖已经在下沉市场形成了一定的市场影响力,等于把基础工作已经做好了。另一方面,瑞幸、星巴克带来的咖啡文化冲击的势能也非常明显,下沉市场的咖啡消费心智正在快速培育,大众咖啡的消费需求持续爆发,成为整个行业最大的增量来源。
与此同时,下沉市场的咖啡消费,天然适配平价、刚需、便捷的消费属性,与瑞幸主导的大众咖啡模式高度契合,却与传统高端精品咖啡的业态完全脱节,这为中小餐饮品牌提供了绝佳的超车机会。专业咖啡品牌下沉市场,需要从零开始布局门店、培育客群、搭建渠道,拓店成本高、市场渗透速度慢。
而深耕下沉市场多年的本土餐饮、茶饮品牌,早已完成全域门店布局,扎根社区、街边、县域商圈等各类下沉场景,拥有极强的区域市场渗透率。依托现有门店快速上线咖啡业务,能够无需大规模投入、无需漫长培育期,快速抢占下沉咖啡市场份额,用存量资源撬动增量市场,实现传统餐饮品牌在新赛道的弯道超车,打破原有行业的竞争固化格局。
图片关键词
第四,打造第二增长曲线的迫切需求正在驱动各方前赴后继。当前,餐饮行业面临同质化严重、增长乏力的困境,茶饮行业同样陷入内卷,流量红利见顶,单店营收增长承压,寻找第二增长曲线成为企业的迫切需求。而瑞幸的盈利模式,核心在于以高性价比产品吸引流量,依托规模化运营降低成本,再通过高频消费实现盈利,这种模式的关键在于规模化与成本控制。
餐饮、茶饮企业复用现有资源,恰好能完美契合这一逻辑,依托现有门店实现规模化布局,复用供应链降低运营成本,借助现有客群实现高频消费转化,这种轻资产、高效率的运营模式,能以最低成本复刻瑞幸的盈利路径。它们无需投入巨额资金搭建独立体系,就能快速形成规模效应,在控制风险的同时,开辟新的营收增长点。
对于陷入增长瓶颈的企业而言,这种依托核心资源跨界的模式,不仅降低了创新风险,更能快速见效,成为破解增长焦虑的最优解,自然成为企业竞相追逐的机会。
从长期来看,咖啡业态的普及已经成为一种大势所趋,咖啡也不再是那种小众精英的饮品,越来越多的企业跨界进入咖啡市场也就成为顺理成章的事情了。
(本文图片来源为:UNsplash)
来源:北京号
作者: 江瀚视野

In recent years, the competition in the catering market has become increasingly fierce. In this almost close combat market, everyone is trying their best to enhance their competitiveness, and the most significant trend is to collectively enter the coffee track. So, why do catering companies want to be "Luckin Coffee"?

1、 Over 100000 restaurants enter the coffee market

According to a report by Red Restaurant Network, over 100000 restaurants are entering the coffee market at the same time. What changes will occur in the market? In the past few years, Luckin Coffee has taken coffee down from the pedestal with its "affordable coffee" and "coffee milk tea transformation", and has embarked on a new track in the Chinese market, firmly establishing its leading position.

In recent times, from top brands of new tea drinks to chain fast food giants, they have been "opening coffee shops". Their methods are exactly the same as Luckin Coffee's - "affordable coffee" and "coffee milk tea". That is to say, these catering giants holding tens of thousands of stores are not targeting Starbucks, but Luckin.

Not long ago, Jasmine Milk White launched its coffee series products "400 Yuan Yang Tai Milk" and "Needle King Apple Latte" for the first time in more than 2300 stores nationwide. According to industry media "Kemen", on the day of its launch, multiple stores across the country directly sold over 210000 cups of new products within 8 hours. Recently, products such as Vanilla Seed Vienna and Bitter Orange Latte launched by Guming have also become small bestsellers.

In 2023, KFC officially launched its independent coffee brand, Kenyue Coffee. In just over two years, it has opened more than 2600 stores and plans to expand to 5000 by the end of 2027.

In May 2024, McDonald's Coffee announced its latest data, with over 3500 stores nationwide at that time. Now, two years have passed and its scale is only expected to increase.

By the end of 2025, Wallace will install coffee machines in tens of thousands of stores across the country; Chinese rice fast food brands such as Laoxiangji and Chaoyixing have also entered the coffee business.

Starting from March this year, Meixue Ice City has successively launched coffee machines in its stores across the country, officially entering the field of freshly ground coffee. And its sub brand Lucky Coffee had already opened over 10000 stores worldwide in November last year, surpassing the vast majority of coffee brands in scale.

2、 Why do everyone want to be 'Luckin'?

Recently, the Chinese freshly made beverage market has ushered in an unprecedented "melee", with various tea and catering enterprises entering the coffee market. What does such a large-scale layout mean?

Firstly, Luckin Coffee has proven that popular coffee for the general public is a good business. Before Luckin Coffee, the Chinese coffee market had long been defined by international giants, with coffee being branded with a strong "third space" social attribute and cultural imprint of the elite class. This model was essentially a high premium, low-frequency "niche business". At that time, buying a cup of coffee was just a social currency on social media and was even defined as a kind of light luxury product. The success of Ruixing lies in that it reconstructs the industrial attribute of coffee with the flow thinking of the Internet, and forcibly pulls coffee back from the "social currency" to the original position of "functional drinks", making coffee return to the origin of the berries used by Ethiopian shepherds to refresh their minds overnight.

The popular coffee priced at 9.9 yuan may seem to squeeze profit margins, but it is actually a blow to the traditional coffee market in terms of dimensionality reduction and bottom-up harvesting. It completely broke the price threshold, pulling a large group of people who originally didn't drink coffee into the funnel of coffee consumption, achieving exponential expansion of the market. This is also why Luckin, after experiencing financial fraud and delisting crises that other brands may have already suffered, has become more resilient and even rebounded from the bottom.

When the market saw Luckin Coffee's number of stores ranking first in the world, capital and industry truly awakened: in China, large-scale civilian coffee is the real cash cow. This demonstration effect is extremely disruptive, as it makes all practitioners realize that the end of coffee is not petty bourgeois sentiment, but ultimate cost-effectiveness and massive repeat purchases.

Secondly, the marginal cost of cross-border coffee production is extremely low. Many people may not understand why brands that make milk tea can make coffee so quickly? The reason is very simple: a coffee machine costs tens of thousands of yuan, and even some low-end coffee machines such as drip coffee are cheaper. As a basic agricultural product, the commercial procurement cost of coffee beans is extremely low, and training a shop assistant to make coffee may only take a few days. Compared to investing hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars to open a new store, adding a few coffee machines to an existing store is simply a "convenient thing".

More importantly, these brands have three things that Luckin Coffee spent a huge amount of money to build back then: a ready-made store network, a ready-made customer base, and a mature supply chain system. Meixue Ice City has over 20000 stores, each of which is a potential selling point for coffee; Guming has nearly ten thousand stores, and customers in each store have a habit of consuming beverages. You don't need to re educate the market, relocate, or rebuild the supply chain. You just need to add a SKU to your existing business.

This is a significant scope economy effect, where companies utilize existing resources and capabilities to enter new business areas at extremely low marginal costs. For these catering and tea beverage brands, coffee is not a new business, but an "increment" that can be almost zero cost grafted onto existing businesses. This cross-border cost-effectiveness is so high that it is irresistible.

Thirdly, the rapidly sinking market can be described as a high-quality blue ocean for various companies. In the past, competition in the domestic coffee market was mainly concentrated in the core business districts of first tier and new first tier cities, and the competition on the track became increasingly fierce. The market structure of top brands was basically stable, and small and medium-sized brands and latecomers found it difficult to break through in the core market. But currently, the Chinese coffee industry is in a critical stage of rapidly sinking from core cities to third - and fourth tier cities, county-level markets, and township markets. On the one hand, this market is not a novice without any foundation. In recent years, Kudi Coffee and Lucky Coffee have formed a certain market influence in the sinking market, which means that the basic work has been done well. On the other hand, the potential impact of Luckin Coffee and Starbucks on coffee culture is also very evident. The coffee consumption mentality in the sinking market is rapidly cultivating, and the demand for popular coffee continues to explode, becoming the largest source of growth for the entire industry.

At the same time, coffee consumption in the sinking market naturally adapts to the attributes of affordable, essential, and convenient consumption, which is highly compatible with Luckin Coffee's dominant mass coffee model, but completely disconnected from the traditional high-end boutique coffee format, providing excellent overtaking opportunities for small and medium-sized catering brands. Professional coffee brands sinking into the market require starting from scratch to layout stores, cultivate customer groups, and build channels. The cost of expanding stores is high, and the speed of market penetration is slow.

Local catering and tea brands that have been deeply cultivating the sinking market for many years have already completed a comprehensive store layout, rooted in various sinking scenes such as communities, streets, and county-level commercial districts, and have a strong regional market penetration rate. By relying on existing stores to quickly launch coffee business, it is possible to quickly seize the market share of sinking coffee without large-scale investment or a long cultivation period, leverage existing resources to drive incremental markets, and achieve traditional catering brands to overtake in the new track, breaking the rigid competition pattern of the original industry.

Fourthly, the urgent need to create a second growth curve is driving all parties to move forward one after another. Currently, the catering industry is facing the dilemma of severe homogenization and weak growth, while the tea beverage industry is also experiencing internal competition, with traffic dividends peaking and single store revenue growth under pressure. Finding a second growth curve has become an urgent need for enterprises. The core of Luckin's profit model lies in attracting traffic with cost-effective products, reducing costs through large-scale operations, and achieving profitability through high-frequency consumption. The key to this model lies in scale and cost control.

Catering and tea beverage enterprises can perfectly fit this logic by reusing existing resources, relying on existing stores to achieve large-scale layout, reusing supply chains to reduce operating costs, and leveraging existing customer groups to achieve high-frequency consumption conversion. This light asset, high-efficiency operating model can replicate Luckin's profit path at the lowest cost. They do not need to invest huge amounts of money to build independent systems, and can quickly form economies of scale, while controlling risks and opening up new revenue growth points.

For enterprises that are stuck in growth bottlenecks, this cross-border model relying on core resources not only reduces innovation risks, but also quickly yields results, becoming the optimal solution to solve growth anxiety and naturally becoming an opportunity for enterprises to compete for.

In the long run, the popularization of the coffee industry has become a trend, and coffee is no longer the beverage of niche elites. More and more companies are entering the coffee market across borders, which is a natural thing.

(Image source for this article: UNsplash)

Source: Beijing Number

Author: Jiang Han's Perspective


首页HP
产品PD
公司Co.
资讯News
联系Cont
搜索SRCH