Seesaw的精品咖啡梦“碎”了Seesaw's dream of premium coffee has been shattered
■中国城市报记者 张亚欣《中国城市报》（2026年07月06日 第 11 版）
从135家门店收缩至34家、累计被执行金额超1400万元、创始人被限制高消费……曾被视为中国精品咖啡启蒙者的Seesaw Coffee（西舍咖啡，下称“Seesaw”），在这个夏天正式进入破产清算程序。
倒在2026年夏天的精品咖啡品牌，Seesaw不是第一个。据窄门餐眼数据，近一年全国关停咖啡门店近4万家。同一时期，瑞幸净增8708家，Manner门店突破2400家，M Stand保持550家规模。头部阵营加速膨胀，长尾批量出清，被夹在中间的中型连锁首当其冲。
在北京、成都等城市，Seesaw的门店已全部关停；在上海，仍有门店坚持营业；在长沙和东北，部分加盟店反而实现了正向盈利。同样的品牌、同样的市场周期，不同的城市呈现出截然不同的命运。资本扩张逻辑与精品商业本质之间的错位是这场分化的根源。围绕Seesaw的“城市撤退地图”，一个现实问题摆到了台面上：中国精品咖啡未来的出路，到底是什么？
Seesaw的“城市撤退地图”
2023年是Seesaw的高光时刻。窄门餐眼数据显示，当年门店总数达到135家，覆盖全国多地。如今，营业门店仅剩34家，版图大幅收缩。北京全部关停，成都、武汉、广州、深圳同样如此。上海作为大本营，其官方小程序显示目前在营门店仅剩3家。不过，长沙、东北等地的加盟店仍能实现正向盈利。
全联并购公会信用管理委员会专家安光勇在接受中国城市报记者采访时分析，这条收缩轨迹的实质，是“高溢价精品咖啡”在不同城市的模型验证。北京、成都率先失守，说明高租金、高竞争的市场已无法支撑30元以上的中端精品定价；上海之所以还在经营，与这座城市更成熟的咖啡文化和更强的品牌心智有关；而长沙和东北加盟店的盈利，证明低租金、本地化经营反而更容易跑通。
曾经常年光顾Seesaw的上海消费者王琳告诉中国城市报记者，2019年她在愚园路首店第一次喝到Seesaw的燕麦拿铁，之后几乎每周都去。“那时候店里经常满座，周末还要排队。”今年3月，她发现公司附近那家店关了，“有点意外，但也没太意外，毕竟价格越来越贵，出品也不太稳定了。”
一位咖啡从业者向中国城市报记者表示：“不是上海人更爱喝咖啡，是上海市场对咖啡定价的容忍度更高。”
业内人士表示，所谓的“模型验证”，在不同城市的落地结果各有不同。同一个品牌、同一套标准在部分城市无法覆盖成本，在另一部分城市却仍有利润空间，真正的分界线不是城市能级，而是成本结构与消费能力的匹配度。
夹心层的困境
瑞幸和库迪把价格打到10元以下之后，一批原本活得不错的精品咖啡品牌开始集体陷入困境。
据窄门餐眼数据，近一年关停的咖啡门店中，相当比例集中在数十至百家规模的精品连锁。这批品牌具备共同的结构性难题，比如大品牌靠规模化采购和标准化模型把租金、人力成本压到最低，小咖啡馆靠老板亲自守店、社区熟客和低房租也能维持运转，中型连锁既没有大品牌的规模效应，也没有小店铺的运营弹性。总部养着一支管理团队，设计费、装修费、运营成本一样不少，门店数量却不足以把成本摊薄。
苏商银行特约研究员武泽伟将这种状态称为“夹心层困境”。“门店规模没有大到足以摊薄总部的管理成本和设计成本，也没有小到可以靠老板亲自守店维持灵活运营。”他在接受中国城市报记者采访时说，“当资本不再持续输血，这批品牌既要面对头部品牌的价格碾压，又无法像独立小店那样灵活转身。”
安光勇的观察更犀利：“总部的钱花出去了，设计的钱花出去了，管理的钱也花出去了，但门店数量不够，规模效应始终没形成。”
精品咖啡的核心竞争力在于慢生长、非标体验和空间调性，资本的逻辑却是快速复制和规模扩张。一个需要慢的生意被装进了一个追求快的模型里，节奏从一开始就不匹配。安光勇对此总结道：“Seesaw的问题不是精品咖啡本身，而是精品逻辑与资本扩张节奏不匹配。”
空间溢价为何失灵
Seesaw长期奉行“一店一设计”的全直营大店模式，单店面积远高于行业平均水平，设计费、装修费、租金和人力成本叠加，单店投入远超行业同体量品牌。这套打法在资本充裕时是品牌护城河，在资本退潮后变成了成本黑洞。
在盘古智库高级分析员江瀚看来，Seesaw在资本化扩张阶段并未跑通可持续的单店盈利模型。品牌依靠资本输血快速铺店，但精细化运营、成本管控和供应链议价能力没有同步跟上，门店固定成本长期居高不下。
2024年开始，价格战把咖啡行业定价体系彻底打乱。瑞幸和库迪把现磨咖啡的单价打到10元以下，消费者对30元以上咖啡的心理防线越来越坚固。当一杯咖啡的价格差从10元拉大到20元，Seesaw的空间溢价就不再能说服足够多的人为之买单。
“在咖啡价格战的冲击下，消费者的价格敏感度被重新训练，精品咖啡原本依赖的空间溢价和品牌调性正在快速贬值。一旦消费者习惯用9.9元作为咖啡的心理锚点，30元以上的价格带就很难再获得稳定的复购。”苏商银行特约研究员武泽伟在接受中国城市报记者采访时称，这不是Seesaw一家的问题，而是整个中端精品咖啡定价体系的系统性问题。
同样的逻辑，也可以用来审视Seesaw长期依赖的“空间溢价”。当消费者不再愿意为一杯精品咖啡支付超过30元时，花大价钱装修出来的空间，还能不能转化为真实的购买力？
安光勇认为，空间溢价没有完全失效，不过，“只靠装修卖贵咖啡”的时代已经结束了。今天消费者更看重产品稳定、价格合理、购买便利。空间本身必须能转化为复购、社群、内容传播和品牌资产，否则就是纯粹的成本中心。
目前，Seesaw仍有部分门店保持盈利，集中在长沙等地的加盟店。在安光勇看来，Seesaw的品牌价值尚未归零，在行业认知、人才培养、精品咖啡启蒙和局部区域门店上仍有积累。但这个品牌更适合小范围重组，不适合继续讲全国扩张故事。
精品咖啡的下一站
供应链成熟了，同质化也随之而来。
云南咖啡精品率持续提升，进口生豆贸易稳定，烘焙技术与设备普及，好豆子、好设备、好烘焙已不再是少数品牌的专属。过去靠选豆和烘焙就能做出差异化的时代正在成为过去。
安光勇判断，中端精品品牌在原料和基础工艺上已经很难拉开差距。未来的竞争壁垒，要么来自上游独家豆源和风味研发，要么来自本地文化、社群关系和产品记忆点。“精品咖啡下一阶段不是比谁更‘精品’，而是比谁更懂成本、场景和用户。”
武泽伟则给出了更具体的路径。他认为，精品咖啡品牌需要从多个维度同时构建壁垒：供应链端建立产地直采和专属微批次合作，产品端打造有辨识度的特调系列和季节限定款，空间端结合本地文化做出不可复制的门店体验，品牌端则要建立能唤起圈层认同的价值主张。这些能力拼在一起，才可能形成真正的差异化。
Seesaw倒下了，但不代表精品咖啡没有市场。窄门餐眼数据显示，近一年咖啡赛道仍有新品牌进入，其中不少以独立小店或区域品牌的形式出现。它们不再复制Seesaw的大店模式，转而用更轻量的模型、更精准的客群定位和更务实的成本结构，在各自的城市角落里寻找生存空间。
精品咖啡的第一轮资本扩张结束了，但精品咖啡本身没有结束。下一个阶段的赢家，或是那些更懂成本控制、更贴近本地市场、更精准定位客群的轻量级品牌。
Reporter Zhang Yaxin from China City Daily
China City Daily (11th edition, July 6, 2026)
Seesaw Coffee, once regarded as the pioneer of Chinese boutique coffee, has officially entered bankruptcy liquidation this summer, shrinking from 135 stores to 34, with a cumulative executed amount exceeding 14 million yuan, and its founder restricted from high consumption.
Seesaw is not the first boutique coffee brand to fall in the summer of 2026. According to data from Narrow Gate Restaurant, nearly 40000 coffee shops have been shut down nationwide in the past year. During the same period, Luckin Coffee saw a net increase of 8708 stores, Manner stores surpassed 2400, and M Stand maintained a scale of 550. The top faction is accelerating its expansion, and the long tail is being cleared in batches, with medium-sized chains caught in the middle bearing the brunt.
In cities such as Beijing and Chengdu, all Seesaw stores have been shut down; In Shanghai, there are still stores that insist on operating; In Changsha and Northeast China, some franchise stores have actually achieved positive profits. The same brand, the same market cycle, different cities present completely different fates. The mismatch between the logic of capital expansion and the essence of boutique business is the root of this differentiation. Around Seesaw's' Urban Retreat Map ', a real question has been put on the table: What is the future path for Chinese specialty coffee?
Seesaw's "City Retreat Map"
2023 is the highlight of Seesaw. According to data from Narrow Gate Restaurant, the total number of stores reached 135 that year, covering many parts of the country. Nowadays, there are only 34 operational stores left, and the market has significantly shrunk. Beijing has been completely shut down, as have Chengdu, Wuhan, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen. As the headquarters, Shanghai's official mini program shows that there are currently only 3 stores in operation. However, franchise stores in Changsha, Northeast China and other places can still achieve positive profits.
An Guangyong, an expert from the Credit Management Committee of the All China Federation of Mergers and Acquisitions, analyzed in an interview with China City Daily that the essence of this contraction trajectory is the model validation of "high premium boutique coffee" in different cities. Beijing and Chengdu were the first to fall, indicating that the high rent and high competition market can no longer support mid-range boutique pricing above 30 yuan; The reason why Shanghai is still operating is related to its more mature coffee culture and stronger brand awareness; The profits of franchise stores in Changsha and Northeast China prove that low rent and localized operations are actually easier to succeed.
Wang Lin, a Shanghai consumer who used to frequent Seesaw, told China City Daily reporters that she first tasted Seesaw's oat latte at the first store on Yuyuan Road in 2019 and has been going there almost every week since then. At that time, the store was often full and had to queue up on weekends. "In March of this year, she found that the store near her company had closed." It was a bit surprising, but not too surprising, after all, prices were getting more and more expensive and the products were not very stable
A coffee practitioner told a reporter from China City Daily, "It's not that Shanghai people love to drink coffee more, it's that the Shanghai market has a higher tolerance for coffee pricing
Industry insiders say that the so-called "model validation" has different implementation results in different cities. The same brand and set of standards may not cover costs in some cities, but there is still profit margin in other cities. The real dividing line is not the city level, but the matching degree between cost structure and consumption ability.
The dilemma of the sandwich layer
After Luckin Coffee and Kudi lowered their prices to below 10 yuan, a group of previously thriving boutique coffee brands began to collectively face difficulties.
According to data from Narrow Gate Restaurant, a considerable proportion of coffee shops that have closed in the past year are concentrated in boutique chains with a scale of tens to hundreds. These brands share common structural challenges, such as large brands relying on large-scale procurement and standardized models to minimize rental and labor costs, small coffee shops relying on the owner's personal supervision, community loyal customers, and low rent to maintain operation, and medium-sized chains lacking the economies of scale of large brands or operational flexibility of small shops. The headquarters maintains a management team with considerable design, decoration, and operating costs, but the number of stores is not enough to dilute the costs.
Wu Zewei, a special researcher at Su Shang Bank, refers to this state as the "sandwich class dilemma". The scale of the stores is not large enough to dilute the management and design costs of the headquarters, nor is it small enough to rely on the owners to personally maintain flexible operations, "he said in an interview with China City Daily." When capital no longer continues to be injected, these brands will not only face price crushing from top brands, but also cannot turn around flexibly like independent small stores
An Guangyong's observation is sharper: "The headquarters' money has been spent, the design money has been spent, and the management money has also been spent, but the number of stores is not enough, and the scale effect has never been formed
The core competitiveness of premium coffee lies in slow growth, non-standard experience, and spatial tonality, while the logic of capital is rapid replication and scale expansion. A business that needs to be slow was loaded into a model that pursues speed, and the pace did not match from the beginning. An Guangyong summarized this as follows: "The problem with Seesaw is not the specialty coffee itself, but the mismatch between the boutique logic and the pace of capital expansion. ”
Why does spatial premium fail
Seesaw has long adhered to a fully direct operated large store model of "one store, one design", with a single store area far exceeding the industry average. The design fees, decoration fees, rent, and labor costs are combined, and the investment in a single store far exceeds that of the same volume brands in the industry. This strategy is a brand moat when capital is abundant, but becomes a cost black hole when capital recedes.
In the view of Jiang Han, a senior analyst at Pangu Think Tank, Seesaw did not implement a sustainable single store profit model during the capitalization expansion phase. Brands rely on capital infusion to quickly establish stores, but their refined operations, cost control, and supply chain bargaining power have not kept up, resulting in long-term high fixed costs for stores.
Starting from 2024, the price war will completely disrupt the pricing system of the coffee industry. Luckin Coffee and Kudi have lowered the unit price of freshly ground coffee to below 10 yuan, and consumers' psychological defenses against coffee priced above 30 yuan are becoming increasingly strong. When the price difference of a cup of coffee increases from 10 yuan to 20 yuan, Seesaw's space premium can no longer convince enough people to pay for it.
Under the impact of the coffee price war, consumers' price sensitivity has been retrained, and the spatial premium and brand tone that premium coffee originally relied on are rapidly depreciating. Once consumers become accustomed to using 9.9 yuan as a psychological anchor for coffee, it is difficult to obtain stable repeat purchases for price bands above 30 yuan. "Wu Zewei, a special researcher at Su Shang Bank, said in an interview with China City Daily that this is not a problem with Seesaw alone, but a systemic problem in the entire mid-range premium coffee pricing system.
The same logic can also be used to examine the "spatial premium" that Seesaw has long relied on. When consumers are no longer willing to pay more than 30 yuan for a cup of premium coffee, can the space decorated at a high price still be converted into real purchasing power?
An Guangyong believes that space premium has not completely become ineffective, but the era of "selling expensive coffee solely through decoration" has ended. Today, consumers place greater emphasis on product stability, reasonable pricing, and ease of purchase. The space itself must be able to be transformed into repurchases, communities, content dissemination, and brand assets, otherwise it is purely a cost center.
At present, Seesaw still has some stores that maintain profitability, concentrated in franchise stores in Changsha and other places. In An Guangyong's view, Seesaw's brand value has not yet reached zero, and there is still accumulation in industry awareness, talent cultivation, boutique coffee enlightenment, and local regional stores. But this brand is more suitable for small-scale restructuring and is not suitable for continuing to tell the story of national expansion.
The next stop for premium coffee
As the supply chain matures, homogenization also follows.
The premium rate of Yunnan coffee continues to increase, the import of raw beans is stable, baking technology and equipment are popularized, and good beans, good equipment, and good baking are no longer exclusive to a few brands. The era where differentiation could be achieved through bean selection and baking is becoming a thing of the past.
An Guangyong judged that it is difficult for mid-range boutique brands to widen the gap in raw materials and basic craftsmanship. The future competition barriers will either come from upstream exclusive bean sources and flavor research and development, or from local culture, community relationships, and product memory points. The next stage of premium coffee is not about who is more 'premium', but about who understands costs, scenarios, and users better
Wu Zewei provided a more specific path. He believes that boutique coffee brands need to build barriers from multiple dimensions simultaneously: establishing direct sourcing from production areas and exclusive micro batch cooperation on the supply chain side, creating distinctive special series and seasonal limited edition products on the product side, combining local culture to create an irreplaceable store experience on the spatial side, and establishing a value proposition that can evoke recognition from the community on the brand side. Only by combining these abilities can true differentiation be formed.
Seesaw has fallen, but that doesn't mean boutique coffee has no market. According to data from Narrow Gate Restaurant, new brands have entered the coffee market in the past year, many of which have appeared in the form of independent small shops or regional brands. They no longer replicate Seesaw's large store model, but instead use lighter models, more accurate customer segmentation, and more pragmatic cost structures to find survival space in their respective urban corners.
The first round of capital expansion for boutique coffee has ended, but boutique coffee itself has not ended. The winners of the next stage, or those lightweight brands that understand cost control better, are closer to the local market, and have a more precise positioning of their customer base.