杭州网红咖啡坠落:关店百家,5年烧光1亿Hangzhou internet celebrity coffee falls: closing 100 stores, burning 100 million in 5 years

2026-08-25 13:40:14 admin 2327

来源:界面新闻

文|天下网商

如果不是T97创始人李潇在个人社交平台上的主动“自曝”,很多人或许早已忘了这个咖啡品牌。

“咖啡你冲不冲,冲冲冲冲冲!”2022年,大嘴妹喊麦的魔性直播一夜之间带火T97咖啡,是直播间现象级案例。但近日,李潇发型凌乱、神色憔悴地出现在个人账号“潇掌柜”的镜头前,详细透露了T97最新现状:五年时间,T97曾签约超500家门店,如今全国只剩11家,累计亏损超1亿元,他甚至用上了“大败局”三个字来概括这一段创业历程。

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T97创始人李潇在社交媒体自曝创业败局

《天下网商》搜索团购平台,T97总部所在地杭州只剩西湖中山公园店一家T97门店,另有多家门店处于歇业关闭状态。

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Seesaw破产清算的余温还没散去,咖啡赛道又一个曾经的网红正在倒下。T97已进入较为明显的收缩状态,李潇称已将精力投入另一个项目。

但值得记录的不只是一个品牌兴衰的历史,而是这个品牌曾试图对抗重力的每一次试错,以及在残酷的市场更迭中,它摸索出的新方向。

“800块引流了600万人”

李潇从来不是一个“文艺咖啡青年”。

在创办T97之前,他的身份是“潇掌柜”,是社交电商战壕里杀出来的老兵。从海淘保健品到天猫第一的“燕格格”,再到GMV(商品交易总额)峰值百亿的“环球捕手”,李潇的擅长是对流量的敏锐捕捉及对用户心理的精准把握。

李潇后来接受媒体访谈时说:“我其实已经是证明过我自己了,二十四五岁就做到了全行业第一名,一年可以赚大几百万,没太缺过钱。”

没太缺过钱的创业者,便会想拿到更大的结果,想留下一个“代表作”。彼时,社交电商平台项目陷入争议,新消费品牌创业如火如荼,李潇自然将目光投到了赛道足够广阔的咖啡领域。

当时,市场上火的是主打减肥的“魔酮咖啡”,T97品牌名称的原意,也是指“体重不过百”。2021年4月,T97推出了第一款产品,代号“小黑条”的减脂咖啡,上线首月便销售额破亿元。李潇表示,T97的上线是经过深度运营的,团队私域运营能力当时在国内是一线水平。第一批备货2000多万,成本大几百万元,对于一个新品牌来说,投入不低,足见决心。

真正让T97破圈的,是2022年9月那场无心插柳的直播实验。

T97从5月就开始在抖音直播,起初数据平平。直到9月,运营团队将喊麦和带货结合,人气突然暴涨。大嘴妹的魔性喊麦席卷全网,单场最高观看人次达到1082万。T97的粉丝量在短短几个月内迅速突破160万。李潇在朋友圈说,他只花了800块的成本,就往直播间引流了600多万人。

线下T97门店也在被“冲”爆。2022 年,T97门店对外宣称日均营收破3000元,9成门店实现盈利。李潇透露,这个营收数据在当时“仅次于瑞幸”。

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大嘴妹魔性喊麦

巅峰时期,李潇在直播间喊出“35个月全面超越瑞幸”“3年开10000家店”等豪言壮语。“这当然不可能实现”,李潇事后复盘,这只是他吸引流量的一贯操作,让用户记住“T97 的老板很喜欢吹牛。我要的是让你认识我、记住我”。

李潇后来在视频中称,2022 年是热血沸腾的一年,大嘴妹是他的“贵人”。大嘴妹所在直播团队能力很强、且非常敬业,一遍一遍磨直播脚本、快速迭代。他同时提到,信任和耐心是重要的。同期有一个品牌也在通过大嘴妹团队直播带货,但“仅一两个月看不到数据反馈就放弃了”。

极致低成本的线上流量爆发让T97成了一个“现象级网红”品牌,据李潇宣称,品牌曾经创下过“近10亿元”的销售额纪录,其中包括了线下门店和私域产品分销总额,这样的“宣传”也吸引了一些渠道商的入局。但过于依赖流量的打法,也让他提前看到了天花板。

曾在Seesaw隔壁开店,T97冲不动了

T97在线上卖得再火,也逃不脱微商大佬卖货的脚本。李潇要为T97规划更远的增长曲线,于是转而在杭州天目里、Seesaw的隔壁,开了一家T97咖啡旗舰店——仅租金就百万级,设计花了30多万。

后来,这成了李潇复盘中T97花的“最冤枉的一笔钱”,连带着开在杭州in 77的另一家旗舰店,两家店亏了800多万。

如今再来看,T97网红旗舰店并不是开给消费者的,也不是给加盟商的,而是给资本看的。

直到事后复盘,李潇并不认为,走到线下的战略是错的。一个判断是,线上品牌会被线下有点位的连锁品牌比下去——这一点在如今几乎可以验证。在此基础上,李潇还有现实的考量。

一方面,T97在私域快速做到数亿销售额,彼时头部品牌隅田川找来肖战等顶流明星代言后,年销额也不过10亿量级;另一方面,彼时资本青睐线下创新型门店,如长沙的虎头局、墨茉点心局用几十家门店撬动了数十亿估值。对当时的李潇来说,走到线下几乎是确定的路。

但战略判断的预见性,没能对冲掉执行层面的溃败,在落子的每一个具体环节里,都交出了超额的学费。譬如由于选址严格、选址费用由品牌承担,仅选址团队一个月差旅成本就超过80万,以至于团队在贵州市场“出差50次,却并没有开出门店”。

关于T97与加盟商的争议,李潇也做了回应,T97一共有75个加盟商开了200多家门店,从未有纠纷。由于宽松的退出机制,加盟商1年内闭店收取的加盟费全额退还、设备5折回收,一方面导致每关一家店公司都要亏损20多万,另一方面,也让一些即使盈利的门店也选择提前关店,锁定收益,导致后期门店数量快速萎缩。

但比执行层面的瑕疵更致命的,其实是市场的重力。

2023年是T97的转折之年,门店扩张迅速熄火,李潇总结品牌正面撞上了诸多严酷的挑战。

其一,来自资本市场。李潇希望通过快速起量拿到大额融资,再用资本换规模,用规模换供应链。但2023年,消费品赛道投资热潮褪去,投资人对于“流量换规模”的故事开始采取更加谨慎的态度,T97完成了从0到1的惊艳,却在从1到10的路上发现,“加油站”关门了。

其二,来自消费端。咖啡消费市场的竞争激烈程度,是李潇始料未及的,在一轮轮“价格补贴大战”中,当和瑞幸抢市场的库迪将咖啡的价格卷到 1 元的地板价时,包括 T97 在内的其他咖啡品牌,生存空间瞬间备受挤压。

李潇称咖啡市场为“死亡赛道”,但如果把T97的退潮全部归因于赛道本身,也并不准确。过去几年,中国咖啡消费和门店规模仍在扩张,真正发生变化的,是这门生意的竞争门槛。

T97最擅长的是通过低成本获取注意力,但线下连锁最终比拼的是选址、供应链、出杯效率、复购和单店模型。直播间可以在几周内把一个品牌推上热搜,却无法替代每一家门店持续赚钱。

资本退潮和价格战,只是更快暴露了这套经营能力的缺口:当流量不能被转化成稳定的单店盈利,规模越大,亏损也可能被同步放大。

在“死亡赛道”寻找出口

2026年,曾被称为“中国蓝瓶”的精品咖啡品牌Seesaw门店从巅峰135家,收缩到只剩34家,公司进入破产清算。2025年起,供应商开始追讨拖欠货款,部分员工被拖欠工资。

T97靠流量、Seesaw靠精品叙事,两条几乎相反的路径,却走向了相似的结局。

即便是这条赛道里的头部品牌瑞幸,也在感受到压力。

截至2026年二季度末,瑞幸全球门店数达到36310家,季度营收158.86亿元,同比增长28.5%,仍在高速扩张;但自营门店同店销售额同比下降5.3%,而2025年同期为增长13.8%。门店和用户还在增加,存量门店的单店产出却已经开始承压。

库迪的压力更直接。餐里眼大数据显示,2026年上半年,库迪新开门店1674家、关闭2484家,净减少810家,闭店数首次反超新增数;截至8月初,其全球门店规模维持在1.5万家左右。

Tims天好中国也在主动出清低效门店。公司最新财报显示,2026年第二季度总营收2.734亿元,同比下降21.7%;系统同店销售额同比下降17.8%。

但行业并非一片退潮。Manner提供了另一种样本。《2025中国咖啡产业报告》显示,Manner在2025年新增门店超过700家,增速超过40%,累计门店接近2500家。快速扩张的同时,还在涨价,今年4月开始,Manner宣布单品豆SOE咖啡涨价5元,跨出了价格战叙事。

据咖门援引窄门餐眼数据,截至2026年7月,全国咖啡门店约22.7万家,近一年新开5.3万家,净增长却只有1065家。粗略计算,相当于同期约有5.2万家门店退出。市场并非没有需求,而是在用极高的开关店速度重新分配流量、点位和利润。

“咖啡行业真的是太难了,每个品牌都在鲤鱼跃龙门。但跃过去之后,就是一条真龙。”

李潇没有放弃跳跃,亏了1亿后,他看到的机会是便利店咖啡。他透露,他投资的新品牌已经开出100多家线下门店,目前门店模型还在打磨中。

这条赛道里的头部选手是挪瓦咖啡。凭“店中店”模式,2025年初门店数量超过2000家,年底就突破1万家,2026年初完成新一轮数亿元C轮融资。而便利店赛道整体门店规模超过20万家,仍有极大的渗透空间。

T97曾经崛起是靠直播间的魔性喊麦,将品牌名植入消费者的脑海。如今,李潇希望依附于现有的便利店、书店、健身房系统,把自己变成一颗螺丝钉,拧进消费者的日常生活中。

褪去了社交和生活方式的滤镜,咖啡正在成为一种基础设施。尽管与成熟市场相比,中国咖啡的杯量红利依然是长期的确定性,但低效供给的“强制出清”已成当下定局。在泡沫消散后,全行业都在等待那个利润与常态化消费共存的真正平衡点。

Source: Interface News Article | Global Internet Business If it weren't for T97 founder Li Xiao's proactive self disclosure on personal social media platforms, many people may have already forgotten about this coffee brand. In 2022, Big Mouth Girl's magical live broadcast of shouting "Do you brew coffee or not, brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew brew. But recently, Li Xiao appeared in front of his personal account "Xiao Shopkeeper" with a messy hairstyle and a haggard expression, revealing in detail the latest situation of T97: in five years, T97 had signed contracts with over 500 stores, but now there are only 11 left nationwide, with a cumulative loss of over 100 million yuan. He even used the words "big defeat" to summarize this entrepreneurial process. T97 founder Li Xiao reveals entrepreneurial failure on social media According to a search on the group buying platform "Tianxia Wangshang", there is only one T97 store left in Hangzhou, where T97 headquarters is located, the West Lake Zhongshan Park store, and several other stores are closed. The residual heat of Seesaw's bankruptcy liquidation has not dissipated yet, and another former internet celebrity in the coffee industry is falling. T97 has entered a relatively obvious contraction state, and Li Xiao said he has invested his energy in another project. But what is worth recording is not just the history of a brand's rise and fall, but every trial and error that the brand has tried to resist gravity, as well as the new directions it has explored in the cruel market changes. 800 yuan has attracted 6 million people Li Xiao has never been a 'literary coffee youth'. Before founding T97, his identity was "Xiao Shopkeeper", a veteran killed in the trenches of social e-commerce. From cross-border health products to Tmall's number one "Yangge Ge", and to the "Global Catcher" with a peak GMV (Gross Merchandise Volume) of billions, Li Xiao's expertise lies in his keen capture of traffic and precise grasp of user psychology. Li Xiao later said in a media interview, "I have actually proven myself. At the age of 24 or 45, I achieved the top spot in the industry and could earn several million yuan a year. I have never been short of money Entrepreneurs who have never been short of money will want to achieve greater results and leave behind a 'representative work'. At that time, social e-commerce platform projects were embroiled in controversy, and new consumer brand startups were thriving. Li Xiao naturally turned her attention to the coffee industry, which had a broad enough track. At that time, the popular brand in the market was the "magic ketone coffee" that focused on weight loss, and the original meaning of the T97 brand name also referred to "weight less than 100". In April 2021, T97 launched its first product, the fat reducing coffee codenamed "Little Black Bar", with sales exceeding 100 million yuan in its first month of launch. Li Xiao stated that the launch of T97 was deeply operated, and the team's private domain operation capability was at the forefront level in China at that time. The first batch of inventory is over 20 million yuan, with a cost of several million yuan. For a new brand, the investment is not low, which shows determination. The real breakthrough for T97 was the unintentional live streaming experiment in September 2022. T97 has been broadcast live in Tiktok since May. At first, the data was mediocre. Until September, the operation team combined shouting and selling, and the popularity suddenly skyrocketed. Big Mouth Girl's magical shouting microphone swept across the entire internet, with a single highest viewing count of 10.82 million. The fan base of T97 quickly surpassed 1.6 million in just a few months. Li Xiao said on his social media that he only spent 800 yuan to attract more than 6 million people to the live streaming room. Offline T97 stores are also being flooded. In 2022, T97 stores announced that their daily revenue exceeded 3000 yuan, and 90% of stores achieved profitability. Li Xiao revealed that this revenue data was "second only to Luckin" at that time. Big mouthed girl with demonic shouting microphone At its peak, Li Xiao shouted grandiose words such as "surpassing Luckin in 35 months" and "opening 10000 stores in 3 years" in the live broadcast room. This is certainly impossible to achieve, "Li Xiao reviewed afterwards. This is just his consistent operation of attracting traffic, making users remember that" T97's boss likes to brag a lot. What I want is for you to know me and remember me. Li Xiao later claimed in the video that 2022 was a year of hot blood and excitement, and Big Mouth Sister was his "benefactor". The live streaming team where Big Mouth Girl works has strong abilities and is very dedicated, constantly refining the live streaming script and iterating quickly. He also mentioned that trust and patience are important. During the same period, a brand was also promoting its products through live streaming with the Big Mouth Girl team, but gave up after only one or two months without seeing any data feedback. The extremely low-cost online traffic explosion has made T97 a "phenomenal internet celebrity" brand. According to Li Xiao, the brand once set a sales record of "nearly 1 billion yuan", including the total distribution of offline stores and private domain products. This "promotion" has also attracted some channel merchants to enter the market. But the strategy of relying too much on traffic also allowed him to see the ceiling ahead of time. I once opened a store next to Seesaw, but T97 can't charge anymore No matter how popular T97 is online, it cannot escape the script of WeChat business tycoons selling goods. Li Xiao wanted to plan a further growth curve for T97, so she turned to opening a T97 coffee flagship store next to Hangzhou Tianmuli and Seesaw - the rent alone was in the millions, and the design cost was over 300000 yuan. Later, this became the "most unjustified sum of money" spent by T97 in Li Xiao's review, along with another flagship store in Hangzhou in 77, which lost over 8 million yuan. Looking back now, T97's Red Flag flagship store is not for consumers or franchisees, but for capital. Until the retrospective, Li Xiao did not believe that the strategy of going offline was wrong. One judgment is that online brands will be surpassed by offline chain brands with some positioning - this can almost be verified today. On this basis, Li Xiao also has practical considerations. On the one hand, T97 quickly achieved hundreds of millions of sales in the private domain. At that time, the top brand Sumida River recruited top celebrities such as Xiao Zhan for endorsement, but the annual sales volume was only in the range of 1 billion yuan; On the other hand, at that time, capital favored offline innovative stores, such as Hutou Bureau and Momo Dim sum Bureau in Changsha, which used dozens of stores to pry up billions in valuation. For Li Xiao at that time, going offline was almost a definite path. But the foresight of strategic judgment failed to offset the collapse at the execution level, and in every specific link of the downfall, it paid excessive tuition fees. For example, due to strict site selection and brand borne site selection costs, the monthly travel expenses of the site selection team alone exceeded 800000 yuan, resulting in the team traveling 50 times in the Guizhou market without opening any stores. Regarding the dispute between T97 and franchisees, Li Xiao also responded that T97 has a total of 75 franchisees who have opened more than 200 stores and have never had any disputes. Due to the relaxed exit mechanism, franchisees who close their stores within one year will receive a full refund of franchise fees and a 50% discount on equipment recovery. On the one hand, this has resulted in a loss of over 200000 yuan for each store closure. On the other hand, it has also led some profitable stores to choose to close early to lock in profits, resulting in a rapid decline in the number of stores in the later stage. But what is more fatal than flaws at the execution level is actually the gravity of the market. 2023 is a turning point for T97, as store expansion rapidly stalled. Li Xiao summarized that the brand is facing many severe challenges head-on. Firstly, it comes from the capital market. Li Xiao hopes to obtain large-scale financing through rapid volume building, and then exchange capital for scale and scale for supply chain. But in 2023, as the investment boom in the consumer goods industry fades away, investors will adopt a more cautious attitude towards the story of "traffic for scale". The T97 achieved a stunning performance from 0 to 1, but on the way from 1 to 10, they found that the "gas station" had closed. Secondly, it comes from the consumer end. The level of competition in the coffee consumption market was unexpected for Li Xiao. In rounds of "price subsidy wars", when Kudi, who was competing with Luckin Coffee, raised the price of coffee to the floor price of 1 yuan, other coffee brands including T97 were instantly squeezed out of their living space. Li Xiao referred to the coffee market as the 'death track', but it is not accurate to attribute the decline of T97 entirely to the track itself. In the past few years, coffee consumption and store scale in China have continued to expand, and what has truly changed is the competitive threshold of this business. T97 excels at obtaining attention through low cost, but offline chains ultimately compete in location selection, supply chain, cup efficiency, repeat purchases, and single store models. A live streaming room can put a brand on the hot search list within a few weeks, but it cannot replace the continuous profitability of every store. The ebb of capital and price wars have only exposed the gap in this set of business capabilities faster: when traffic cannot be converted into stable single store profits, the larger the scale, the losses may also be amplified synchronously. Searching for an exit on the 'death track' In 2026, the boutique coffee brand Seesaw, once known as the "Chinese Blue Bottle," will shrink from its peak of 135 stores to only 34, and the company will enter bankruptcy liquidation. Starting from 2025, suppliers will begin to pursue overdue payments, and some employees will be owed wages. T97 relies on traffic, while Seesaw relies on high-quality storytelling. These two almost opposite paths lead to similar endings. Even the top brand in this track, Luckin, is feeling pressure. As of the end of the second quarter of 2026, Luckin Coffee had 36310 global stores, with quarterly revenue of 15.886 billion yuan, a year-on-year increase of 28.5%, and is still expanding rapidly; However, the same store sales of self operated stores decreased by 5.3% year-on-year, while the same period in 2025 saw a growth of 13.8%. The number of stores and users is still increasing, but the single store output of existing stores has begun to come under pressure. Kudi's pressure is more direct. According to the big data of Shanliyan, in the first half of 2026, Kudi opened 1674 new stores and closed 2484, a net decrease of 810 stores, and the number of closed stores exceeded the number of new stores for the first time; As of early August, its global store scale remained at around 15000. Tims Tianhao China is also actively clearing out inefficient stores. The latest financial report of the company shows that the total revenue for the second quarter of 2026 was 273.4 million yuan, a year-on-year decrease of 21.7%; The same store sales of the system decreased by 17.8% year-on-year. But the industry is not in decline. Manner provided another sample. The 2025 China Coffee Industry Report shows that Manner will add over 700 new stores by 2025, with a growth rate of over 40%, and a total of nearly 2500 stores. While rapidly expanding, Manner is also raising prices. Starting from April this year, Manner announced a price increase of 5 yuan for single bean SOE coffee, stepping out of the price war narrative. According to data cited by Kamen, as of July 2026, there were approximately 227000 coffee shops nationwide, with 53000 newly opened in the past year and a net growth of only 1065. Roughly speaking, it is equivalent to about 52000 stores exiting during the same period. The market is not without demand, but rather redistributing traffic, locations, and profits with extremely high opening and closing speeds. The coffee industry is really difficult, every brand is jumping over the dragon gate like a carp. But after jumping over, it's a real dragon Li Xiao did not give up on jumping. After losing 100 million, the opportunity he saw was convenience store coffee. He revealed that the new brand he invested in has opened over 100 offline stores, and the store models are still being refined. The top player on this track is Novacoffee. With the "store in store" model, the number of stores will exceed 2000 by the beginning of 2025 and surpass 10000 by the end of the year. A new round of several hundred million yuan C-round financing will be completed in early 2026. The overall store scale of the convenience store track exceeds 200000, and there is still great penetration space. The rise of T97 was once due to the magical shouting in the live broadcast room, which implanted the brand name into consumers' minds. Nowadays, Li Xiao hopes to rely on the existing convenience store, bookstore, and gym systems to turn herself into a screw and screw herself into consumers' daily lives. Removing the filters of social and lifestyle, coffee is becoming an infrastructure. Although the cup size dividend of Chinese coffee is still a long-term certainty compared to mature markets, the "forced clearance" of inefficient supply has become a foregone conclusion. After the foam dissipated, the whole industry was waiting for the real balance point of coexistence of profits and normalized consumption.

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